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The governance of integrated health and social care in England since 2010: great 
expectations not met once again? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Integrating health and social care has long been a goal of policy-makers and practitioners. 
Yet, this aim has remained elusive, partly due to conflicting definitions and a weak evidence 
base.  This article examines the governance of integrated care in England since 2010. It 
focuses on the extent to which the five governance attributes (transparency, accountability, 
participation, integrity and capability; TAPIC) are applicable to integrated care in England. 
The plethora of English policy initiatives on integrated care (such as the `Better Care Fund’, 
personal health budgets, and `Sustainability and Transformation Plans’) mostly shows signs 
of continuity over time although the barriers to integrated care often persist. The article 
concludes that the contribution of integrated care to improved outcomes remains unclear 
and yet it remains a popular policy goal.  Whilst some elements of the TAPIC framework fit 
less well than others to the case of integrated care, the case of integrated care can be better 
understood and explained through this lens.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Integrated care (IC) is widely viewed as offering a potential solution to some of the major 
challenges facing health and social care systems across the world (Goddard and Mason, 
2016). Similarly, according to Busetto et al (2016), IC is seen as one of the most promising of 
sustainable approaches to solve the urgent task for health systems around the globe to 
managing the increasing demand for complex long-term care within constrained financial 
circumstances.  
  
However, the high hopes of the latest fad (Marmor, 2004) may be undermined by two 
factors. First, IC is used as an umbrella term for various concepts and organisational 
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structures (Goddard and Mason, 2016). The terms ‘integration’, ‘coordinated care’ and 
‘joined-up services’ are often used interchangeably and in widely varying contexts. 
(Bickerstaffe, 2013). Shaw et al (2011) identified as many as 175 different usages of ‘IC’ and 
related terms. Curry and Ham (2010) provide a typology of integration, differentiating 
between horizontal (for example, community health and social care services) and vertical 
integration (for example, hospital services and primary/community health services); as well 
as real (organisational) and virtual integration (based around networks, partnerships and 
alliances). Finally, they identify three levels of integration: macro (for a whole population), 
meso (for a particular group such as older people or people with diabetes) and micro (for 
individuals). Interestingly, these definitions tend to imply institutional arrangements rather 
necessarily than the changing practices of clinical professionals (such as delegation or role 
substitution).  
 
Second, the evidence base for IC is rather fragile (e.g. Cameron et al, 2012; Dickinson and 
Sullivan, 2014). The potential impacts of IC care include better access; improved satisfaction 
and experience for patients, carers and health professionals; more appropriate care; 
enhanced preventive care; reduced avoidable hospital admissions and emergency 
admissions; prolonged independent living and delayed admission to institutional care; 
improved health status and quality of life; and enhanced cost-effectiveness (e.g. Ham and 
Curry, 2010; Petch et al, 2013; Mason et al, 2014; Nolte and Pitchforth, 2014). In short, IC is 
claimed to be central to the ‘Triple Aim’ challenge of improving patient experiences and 
patient outcomes while also delivering more cost-effective (Erens et al, 2015b; Busetto et al, 
2016). Moreover, reviews suggest that evaluations tend to focus on processes rather than 
outcomes (Dowling et al, 2004; Cameron et al, 2012; Dickinson and Sullivan, 2014; Mason et 
al 2014, 2015; Busetto et al, 2016). As Goddard and Mason (2016) put it, the overall 
message emerging from most careful evaluations is that the evidence on benefits is rather 
mixed. In particular, the evidence relating to improving health outcomes is weak (e.g; 
Mason et al, 2014, 2015; Busetto et al, 2016) – although Petch (2012) and Petch et al (2013) 
argue that, while early studies focusing on individual outcomes did not provide definitive 
evidence, more recent studies, primarily from outside the UK, have had more promising 
results (eg Curry and Ham, 2010). 
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The prevalence of the IC discourse has found particular resonance in the UK where the 
House of Commons Health Select Committee (2012) argued that integration has been a 
recurring goal in public policy since a lack of coordination between health and social services 
was flagged up in the 1960s (see e.g. Petch et al, 2013,; Bickerstaffe, 2013; Ham et al, 2015). 
There have been a series of initiatives over the last fifty years which have attempted to 
bring health and social care services more closely together, though with limited success 
(Wistow 2012, Bardsley et al 2013, Ham et al 2015; Erens et al 2015b; Wistow et al 2015). In 
short, as Wistow et al (2015) put it, the story of IC initiatives is one of great expectations 
often not met. Similarly, according to Humphries (2015), while the closer integration of 
health and social care has been a policy goal of successive UK governments for many years, 
overall progress has been patchy and limited.  
 
This article explores governance issues concerning IC in England since 2010, focusing on the 
extent to which the five desirable governance attributes (transparency, accountability, 
participation, integrity and capability; TAPIC) are applicable to IC in England, seeking to 
bridge the health and social care divide (Table 1, below).  
 
Table 1 The UK health and social care divide (Glasby, 2017) 
  
Health care 
 
 
Social care 
Accountability 
 
Executive; National (to Secretary 
of State) 
Democratic; Local (to elected 
councillors) 
Policy 
 
Overseen by Department of Health 
(also has responsibility for adult 
social care policy) 
Local government is overseen by 
the Department for Communities 
and Local Government 
Charges 
 
Free at the point of delivery Means-tested and subject to 
charging 
Boundaries 
 
Based on GP registration Based on geography and council 
boundaries 
Focus Individual (medical) cure Individual in their wider context 
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Culture and 
training 
Strongly influenced by medicine 
and science 
Strongly influenced by the social 
sciences 
 
We focus on England as the different countries of the UK are at different points on the 
journey towards more IC. Northern Ireland has had structural integration of health and 
social care since 1973, Scotland is legislating for new health and social care partnerships and 
Wales is still at an early stage (Ham et al, 2013; Bickerstaffe, 2013). 
 
 
The TAPIC Framework 
 
The TAPIC framework has been outlined by Greer et al (2016) and earlier in this collection. 
These five mutually exclusive attributes of governance (transparency, accountability, 
participation, integrity and capability) are thought to influence the kind and consequences 
of decisions a system makes that were developed inductively from a list of about 60 
attributes of governance. In this section, we interpret these attributes in an English context 
before outlining contemporary IC policy and then the application of such policy to the TAPIC 
framework. 
 
Transparency means that institutions inform the public and other actors of both upcoming 
decisions and decisions that have been made, and of the process by and grounds on which 
decisions are being made. Transparency can elide the ways in which revealed data are 
constructed or continue to mask other (undisclosed) data. Transparency mechanisms 
include:  
 watchdog committees;  
 inspectorates;  
 Freedom of Information legislation; 
 performance managing/reporting/assessment; and 
 clear and useful public information. 
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Accountability is broadly seen as a relationship between an actor (such as an agency) and a 
forum (such as a legislature) in which the actor must inform the others of decisions, must 
explain decisions, can be mandated and can be sanctioned (Bovens et al, 2014).  Essentially, 
accountability entails giving an account and being held to account. The former has close 
association with transparency, whilst the latter is resonant of the performance paradigm 
(Bevan and Hood, 2006). Whilst Vrangbaek and Byrkjeflot (2016) distinguish between 
political, administrative, professional, public, market and judicial accountabilities, various 
mechanisms illustrate this aspect of the TAPIC framework:  
 contracts; 
 regulation; delegated regulation;  
 performance standards; and 
 codes of conduct. 
 
Participation means that affected parties have access to decision-making and power so that 
they acquire a meaningful stake in the work of the institution. Clearly, many recent health 
policies have sought specifically to alter the balance of power between these parties. This 
includes a shift towards managerial interests, and often away from professional ones. 
Participation mechanisms include: 
 stakeholder forums;  
 consultations;  
 elections; appointed representatives;  legal remedies;  
 advisory committees, ad hoc or otherwise; 
 partnerships; and 
 joint budgets, joint workforce, etc.  
  
Integrity is a rather vague term which has many synonyms and related terms: predictability, 
anti-corruption, ethics, rule of law, clear allocation of defined roles and responsibility, 
formal rules, and stability. In a sense, integrity is good management. Integrity has 
connotations with trust (which has a rich conceptual history); Greiling (2016) argues that 
public trust is composed of credible commitment, benevolence, honesty, competency and 
fairness. Trust, in turn, shapes the nature and degree of participation (see above). In 
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particular, credible commitment denotes a public service ethos which underpins the 
mechanisms of integrity:  
 solid and well-rewarded internal career trajectories that allow high-level officials to be 
rewarded for service rather than seeking profit or positions outside government;  
 internal audit (to ensure that money moves appropriately);  
 personnel policies (hiring, job descriptions, procedures to weed out flawed people);  
 legislative mandate;  
 budget;  
 procedures; 
 audit; and 
 clear organizational roles and purposes. 
 
Policy capability refers to the ability to develop policy that is aligned with resources in 
pursuit of goals. This covers both the information capacity upon which decisions are based 
and managerial capacity to enact those decisions.  However, such capacity has been 
questioned in terms of the apparent emergence of post-bureaucratic organisations (Pollitt, 
2009), with a propensity for rapid staff turnover and loss of organisational memory. 
Mechanisms to improve policy capacity include: 
 intelligence on performance;  
 intelligence on process;  
 research/analysis capacity ; hiring procedures, to improve the quality of the policy 
bureaucracy;  and 
 procedures to incorporate specialist advice (such as management consultants). 
 
The five components of the TAPIC framework adhere in the sense of a diagnostic or 
prospective analysis of health systems governance.  
 
 
English health policy towards IC since 2010 
 
 
7 
 
The period since 2010 can be divided into the Coalition government (Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat; 2010-2015) and the Conservative government (since 2015). Elements of 
continuity and discontinuity are apparent between all periods. 
 
IC was not originally a major part of the Coalition government’s plans for National Health 
Service (NHS) reform (Ham et al, 2015), but became an explicit policy priority following the 
work of the NHS Future Forum in 2011, prompting a number of amendments to the Health 
and Social Care Act (HSCA) 2012 (Exworthy et al, 2016; Glasby 2016, 2017; Miller and Glasby 
2016). 
 
The NHS Future Forum (Alltimes and Varnam, 2012) had highlighted the tendency for 
‘integration’ to be used by different people in different settings to mean different things. 
National Voices (2013) – a national coalition of patient charities - produced a definition of IC 
from the perspective of service users:   
“My care is planned with people who work together to understand me and my 
carer(s), put me in control, co-ordinate and deliver services to achieve my best 
outcomes.”  
 
Along with its accompanying narrative on person-centred, co-ordinated care, this was 
endorsed by Ministers in the foreword to an official report on ‘Integrated Care and Support: 
Our Shared Commitment’ (2013). The adoption of this definition meant that ‘for the first 
time...we have an agreed understanding of what good integrated care and support looks 
and feels like for individuals’, and provided a 'shared vision……for integrated care and 
support to become the norm in the next five years’ (National Collaboration for Integrated 
Care and Support 2013). Contrary to the tendency described above to focus on IC in terms 
of organisational structures, this definition adopted a more person-centred approach.  
 
However, Ham et al (2015) note that, despite Coalition reforms designed to explicitly 
support joint working, a number of barriers to IC have persisted since 2010, and in some 
have been reinforced by the Coalition’s own reforms. In particular, the fragmentation of 
commissioning responsibilities created by the HSCA 2012 has meant that budgets are widely 
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dispersed across the health and care system, making it difficult to align incentives across 
different providers of care. In 2014, the House of Commons Health Committee argued that 
existing fragmented commissioning structures ‘significantly inhibit the growth of truly 
integrated services’ (HoCHC, 2014). 
 
Miller and Glasby (2016) identify a series of national initiatives and local pilot projects, but 
with an overall health and social care system that was arguably less integrated by 2015 than 
it had been in the late 2000s (see also Glasby 2016, 2017). 
 
(i) Better Care Fund (BCF): is a universal mechanism for creating pooled budgets to protect 
adult social services and reduce demand for acute beds. It consists of a formula-based 
allocation of £3.8bn to fund locally agreed integration plans for 2014/15 and 2015/16. The 
funding is held under joint governance by NHS Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) and 
local authorities through their Health and Well-being Boards (HWBs) (Erens et al, 2015b). 
Access to the Fund was dependent on a local plan which was signed off nationally. However, 
planning for the BCF was heavily criticised by the National Audit Office (2014). Ham et al 
(2015) state that the impact of the BCF will not be known until local plans have been 
implemented in 2015/16. So far, plans from 146 out of 151 local areas have been approved 
by NHS England, projecting savings of around £500 million for the NHS and a reduction of 
just over 3 per cent in emergency admissions. Despite this optimism, it remains to be seen if 
the very ambitious expectations for the BCF’s impact will be met.   
 
(ii) Integrated Care Pioneers (ICPs): in spring 2013, expressions of interest were invited from 
the ‘most ambitious and visionary’ local areas to become ‘Pioneers’ to drive change ‘at scale 
and pace, from which the rest of the country can benefit.’ Fourteen Pioneers were 
announced in November 2013, with a second wave of 11 Pioneers announced in late 
January 2015 and officially started in April 2015. While the Pioneers were given access to 
expertise and support from national partners and international experts, only minimal 
additional funding was provided initially (£20,000), with an additional £90,000 made 
available to each first wave Pioneer in June 2014 (Erens et al, 2015b). Aims of this initiative 
included the improvement of outcomes (notably patient/user experience) and the shift 
towards a model of care much less centred on hospital services.  
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Pioneer governance arrangements primarily involved project boards without formal 
authority and powers, reporting to HWBs or separately to CCGs and local authorities. As a 
result, it was reported that, on some occasions, the Pioneer board struggled to get the 
formal governing bodies to take decisions necessary to progress the Pioneer (Erens, 2015b). 
Involving patients, service users and the public was seen as important in all of the Pioneers, 
although the extent and nature of patient and public involvement (PPI) varied in different 
localities from extensive and well-developed to under development (Erens et al, 2015b). . 
 
Ham et al (2015) report that some ICPs reported progress in co-ordinating services for their 
local populations. They claim that early reports are promising, offering some hope of 
progress in reducing inappropriate use of hospitals and delivering more care in people’s 
homes. However, early insights from the official national evaluation are more cautious and 
under-whelming, with many sites struggling to make as much progress as initially 
anticipated towards very ambitious aims (Erens et al, 2015a, 2015b).  In addition, there has 
been an evaluation of the Whole Systems Integrated Care (WSIC) programme in North West 
London, the largest ICP (Wistow et al, 2015)   
 
(iii) Vanguards: in January 2015, NHS England called for local proposals to become 
‘vanguard’ areas to prototype some of those models. Twenty-nine vanguard sites were 
announced in March 2015, and a further eight ‘urgent and emergency care vanguards’ were 
announced in July 2015. Three of the vanguard sites (partially) overlap geographically with 
the first wave Pioneers. Areas with a track record of joint working receiving additional 
funding/support to test new ways of integrating care within the community and between 
hospitals and the community.  This was a key feature of the NHS England (2014) Five year 
forward view, a strategy produced by the new Chief Executive of NHS England to set out the 
direction of travel for the NHS in a difficult policy and financial context. Whilst the allocation 
of additional resources and support to areas which have a history of collaborative working 
may be welcomed (not least by these areas themselves), it is far from clear whether the 
policy learning can be effectively transferred to other areas. Areas without such a 
collaborative legacy are likely to face qualitatively different barriers (and facilitators) to IC. 
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There is also significant overlap and confusion between the Pioneers and the Vanguards – 
with two similar but slightly different initiatives launched in quick succession. 
 
(iv) Personal budgets (PBs)/personal health budgets (PHBs): the desire to promote greater 
personalisation (by enabling people using health and social care services to know how much 
is available to spend on their care and to exercise greater control over this money) has been 
well-established in adult social care (Needham and Glasby, 2014). Alakeson (2013) notes 
that PHBs regard ‘the individual as service integrator’, with integration at the level of the 
individual, driven by the individual. This is a relatively new approach to the creation of IC 
that presents an alternative to structural integration and (professionally-led) care 
coordination. The PHB initiative was proposed in the NHS Next Stage Review (Darzi, 2008) as 
a way to encourage the NHS to become more responsive to the needs of patients, and re-
aﬃrmed in the 2010 White Paper ‘Equity and Excellence’ (DH, 2010) (Jones et al, 2013). The 
evaluation of the PHB pilot in England reports that they did not appear to have an impact on 
health status, mortality rates, health-related quality of life or costs at 12 months, but was 
associated with significant improvement in patients’ care-related quality of life and 
psychological well-being over the same period (Forder et al, 2012; Jones et al, 2013).  
 
(v) Health and WellBeing Boards ((HWBs) are formally local government committees, and 
comprising representatives from local authorities, CCGs and local Healthwatch organisations 
(representing patient interests), and other members appointed at the discretion of local 
areas. HWBs were a core part of the government’s vision for enabling whole system working 
(Coleman et al, 2016). Boards were tasked with assessing the needs of their local 
population, developing a joint health and well-being strategy to offer a strategic framework 
for local commissioning decisions, and promoting greater integration of services – for 
example, through encouraging joint commissioning and the use of pooled budgets (Ham et 
al, 2015). HWBs are the point at which all local stakeholders with an interest in the 
community’s well-being should come together, having local responsibility for leading 
integration. Sitting within local authorities, the Boards have a democratic underpinning, as 
they include elected councillors; most have senior-level shared leadership, with a senior 
Councillor chair and a representative of the CCG acting as vice-chair (Humphries and Galea, 
2013; Bickerstaffe, 2013). 
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Positive features of HWBs included GP involvement, better governance and accountability, 
encouragement of wider inter-organisational linkages, and the re-location of public health 
from the NHS to local government. However, previous initiatives have similarly promised 
much but have delivered less. This may be in part, due to the lack of a commissioning role 
for HWBs; instead, they are supposed to be stewards of the local health and social care 
system (Coleman et al, 2016). As HWBs cover areas equivalent to the upper tier of local 
government (county councils or unitary authorities), they offer a place-based approach to 
system planning. Arguably STPs (below) also play this role. Moreover, there were difficult 
discussions in many local areas as to whether HWBs should be commissioning-led (or even 
commissioning only) bodies, or whether they should bring commissioners and providers 
together to develop a shared vision for local services. 
 
 (vi) Sustainability and Transformation Plans (STPs) are plans for the future of health and 
care services in England. NHS organisations in different parts of the country were to 
collaborate to respond to the challenges facing local services. Forty-four areas were 
identified as the geographical ‘footprints’ on which the plans would be based, and final 
plans were due to be completed in October 2016. This is seen as marking ‘a decisive shift’ 
from the focus on competition as a means of improving health service performance in the 
HSCA 2012 towards ‘place-based planning’ (Alderwick and Ham, 2016; Alderwick et al, 
2016). In practice, some emerging plans contain a series of ambitious and controversial 
proposals (for example, reconfiguring acute care, downgrading local emergency 
departments and/or relocating maternity services) – and there has been widespread 
criticism that such plans seem to have been developed ‘behind closed doors’ with little 
public involvement or external scrutiny (see below for further discussion).   
 
 
Discussion: insights on IC from the TAPIC framework 
 
We now apply the TAPIC framework to these recent and current policies. Whilst this is 
inevitably reductionist, we therefore highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the 
framework and its value in such an application. 
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Transparency 
One of the key legacies of the HSCA 2012 is the confusing and fragmented accountabilities 
which it has created (see  ‘accountability’ below). In turn, this has led to a situation where 
there are lots of different initiatives, pilots and plans – each of which may seek to be as 
transparent as possible – but which create such complexity and organisational chaos that 
subsequent decisions and policies will inevitably seem opaque. In some local areas, there 
will be plans drawn up under the BCF, overseen by a HWB – but with additional activities 
being developed by an ICP, a Vanguard and a more regionally-focused STP. 
 
Critics have argued that STPs lack of transparency and participation (Iacobucci 2016, see 
below).  Alderwick et al (2015) report that STP plans have attracted growing political 
attention, including a large number of parliamentary questions; an opposition day debate in 
the House of Commons in September 2016, when many Members of Parliament (MPs) 
voiced concerns about potential cuts to services and the ‘secrecy’ of the STP process; and 
questions about STPs have also been raised at the Public Accounts Committee and the 
Health Select Committee. They state that ‘despite the importance of STPs for the NHS and 
the public, little is known about the process of developing the plans and how the initiative 
has worked in practice’.  
 
Alderwick et al (2016) point out that while the process of selecting a named individual to 
lead the STP varied between their four areas studied, it was rarely seen as being open or 
fair. NHS England and NHS Improvement played a significant role in selecting STP leaders, 
and the strong role played by national bodies also seemed at odds with the original 
emphasis on the STP process being locally led. As well as tight timelines creating a barrier to 
meaningful public engagement, national NHS bodies had also asked STP leaders to keep 
details of draft STPs out of the public domain. This included instructions to actively reject 
Freedom of Information Act requests to see draft plans (Alderwick et al, 2016). Interestingly, 
one of the few STPs to be led by a local government chief executive rather than an NHS 
leader chose to publish their local plan on the Council website.  As noted in one national 
newspaper (Vize, 2016): 
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At least five councils have now published the STP, despite NHS England asking local 
areas to keep them hidden until the central bodies have given their verdict. This 
pointless subterfuge has put local politicians in an invidious position. 
 
Accountability 
According to Bickerstaffe (2013), the local bodies created by the HSCA 2012 have created a 
confusing landscape, and it is not clear who has responsibility – and the power to make 
decisions – for what. Ham et al (2015) report that governance and accountability not only 
changed as a result of the reforms but also became more complex. This was partly because 
of compromises made during and immediately after the Coalition was created and partly 
because of concessions made by the government during the passage of the Bill through 
parliament. A set of policies designed to streamline and simplify the organisation of the NHS 
ended up having the opposite effect. Parliamentarians, among others, were openly and 
frequently critical of the confused accountabilities created by the Act. However, predictions 
that the Health Secretary would no longer be held to account for the NHS proved wide of 
the mark (Ham et al, 2015). 
  
In principle, the Coalition’s reforms expressed an intention to free the NHS from political 
micromanagement and increase local accountability through an independent NHS 
Commissioning Board (which later became NHS England), Healthwatch England and Local 
branches of Healthwatch, local Health and WellBeing Boards, and CCCs  which have a 
statutory duty to involve patients and the public in their decision-making and have  a lay 
member on the board with accountability for patient and public engagement  (Ham et al, 
2015): 
 
Despite all this, the landscape around governance and accountability is complicated. 
Commenting on the £95.6 billion that NHS England is responsible for, the chair of the Public 
Administration Select Committee has said that ‘it is simply not acceptable that there is no 
clarity or clear accountability for that kind of public expenditure’ (House of Commons Public 
Administration Select Committee, 2014).  Moreover, mostexisting accountability 
arrangements are single agency in nature (for example, holding the Board of a Hospital Trust 
accountable for quality, safety and performance), but developments such as the Pioneers, 
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Vanguards and STPs arguably create blurred accountability and make it harder to scrutinise 
key decisions.  By making joint working everybody’s business, perhaps the government has 
made it no one’s responsibility. 
 
Participation 
Since 2010, the government has committed itself greater participation, summed up in the 
mantra: ‘shared decision-making will become the norm: no decision about me without me’ 
(DH 2010). This has included greater involvement of democratically elected Councillors in 
decisions about health care commissioning through HWBs, as well as a significant emphasis 
on public engagement in initiatives such as the Pioneers and Vanguards.  As Forder et al 
(2012) argue, PHBs have scope to improve patient outcomes, by placing patients at the 
centre of decisions about their care.  In individual localities, Wistow et al (2015) write that 
the involvement of lay partners (patients, service users and carers) in the WSIC programme 
has been a striking aspect of the its inclusive approach, with significant time, attention, 
resource and support being provided to it. Indeed, this element of the co-design phase 
appeared to be one of the programme’s defining characteristics. This has been highly valued 
by those working within the WSIC programme, but how far it has enabled wider 
involvement of communities beyond the individual lay partners themselves is yet to be 
seen. 
 
However, despite these efforts, problems remain.  Both the Pioneers and the Vanguards 
remain local pilots, with a lack of clarity as to how new ways of working (and current 
engagement mechanisms) may be mainstreamed.  In terms of STPs, Alderwick et al (2016) 
report that it has been difficult for local leaders to meaningfully involve all parts of the 
health and care system – particularly clinicians and frontline staff – in developing STP plans. 
The involvement of local authorities has also varied widely between STP areas, ranging from 
strong partnership between the NHS and local government to almost no local government 
involvement at all. Moreover, patients and the public have been largely absent from the STP 
process so far. This was partly because of the limited time available to develop plans, and 
partly because national NHS bodies had asked leaders to keep their draft STPs out of the 
public domain. Alderwick et al (2016) report one interviewee asking themselves in a STP 
meeting: ‘where are the real people in this?’, adding that the same question could be asked 
15 
 
for the STP process as a whole. However, being ‘consulted’ on largely formed plans does not 
seem to be a meaningful type of participation.  
 
Integrity 
Of all the areas of the TAPIC framework, integrity raises the most questions in terms of 
approaches to IC.  Despite Conservative promises of no more top-down reorganisations of 
the NHS, the Coalition oversaw one of the biggest reorganisations in the history of the NHS. 
While initial reforms seemed to focus on promoting competition, the sudden conversion to 
the notion of IC after the work of the NHS Future Forum could be viewed as an 
opportunistic attempt to save the Bill rather than a genuine attempt to integrate care.   
 
Moreover, the advent of clinical commissioning raises interesting issues about potential 
conflicts of interest, with GPs having a role as both commissioners and providers, and 
functioning both as leaders of public bodies (CCGs) and as small business people running 
their own individual practices (Glasby and Skelcher, 2012).  STPs have also been accused of 
lacking integrity given the emerging perception that potentially radical changes to services 
could be being developed in very rapid timescales and behind closed doors. 
 
Capacity 
There are significant questions as to whether the current health and social care system has 
sufficient capacity to deliver government policy in practice.  Coalition reforms removed 
much of the capacity at regional and strategic levels, creating a vacuum of system 
leadership (Ham et al, 2015).  For Bickerstaffe (2013), there are four factors, arguably 
lacking in our current system, which will be needed to deliver IC successfully: a long-term 
investment mind-set; aligned incentives; effective use of technology; and flexible workforce) 
are likely to be necessary for delivering integrated systems and more coordinated care 
successfully.  
 
For Wistow et al (2015), local initiatives such as the WISC programme has been 
characterised by strong and effective leadership, clear management and governance 
structures and the influence and credibility of key senior figures. However, changes to the 
leadership of the programme near the end of the evaluation period were seen to have 
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weakened the programme’s strategic management capacity and had become a cause for 
concern. In common with other UK and international programmes of IC, the WSIC 
programme team also found that issues of data sharing, governance and IT have caused 
delays to the overall programme of service change. A commonly agreed need to share data 
for the purposes of improved care coordination so often runs into difficulty when the 
practicalities of interoperable systems, data-sharing agreements, and professional or 
organisational culture come into play. These and other barriers, including payment systems, 
governance structures and organisational fragmentation, cannot be fully removed without 
national action, such as that promised (but not yet delivered) when the national Pioneer 
programme was announced. 
 
In terms of the ICP, Erens et al (2015b) note that many of the barriers to integration 
identified were familiar from previous research into health and social care integration. They 
set out: national barriers (national issues outside Pioneer control; national leadership; 
financial issues); organisational, professional and cultural barriers (organisational structures; 
professional boundaries and cultural differences); and local barriers. The identified factors 
appear to have some relationship with policy capacity, with aspirations thwarted by issues 
such as competing visions, leaderships and operational policies; incompatible IT systems; 
concern about sharing individual data; financial uncertainty; and labour market difficulties. 
In the process, Erens et al (2015b) cite the results of a survey which contrasted the factors 
reported to promote and hinder joint working at local level. The leading factors that 
respondents considered to help integrated working were described as ‘locally determined’ – 
local leadership, vision, strategy and commitment. Conversely, those identified as hindering 
integrated working were predominantly interpreted as ‘nationally determined’ – 
performance regimes, funding pressures and financial complexity. They concluded that the 
centre might have ‘more capacity to do harm than good.’ More generally, the National Audit 
Office (2014) has issued a highly critical report of planning the Better Care Fund.  
 
Alderwick et al (2015) write that the STP areas involved in their research had not received 
any additional money from national NHS bodies to fund the development of their plans. This 
meant that local leaders needed to rely on existing staff and resources to manage the STP 
process, with management consultants were being used to support the development of 
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STPs in three out of their four areas. Some leaders felt that STPs had ‘created an industry’ 
for management consultants and questions were raised about why money is being invested 
in advice from private companies instead of in frontline services. Perhaps the largest 
problem associated with policy capacity relates to implementation. Alderwick et al (2016) 
report that across all STP areas, leaders were concerned about their ability to turn the vision 
being articulated in their STP into reality.  Finally, it should be noted that ‘policy capacity’ 
may be associated with a selection effect. For example, one of selection criteria for Pioneers 
involved ‘demonstrated capability and expertise to successfully deliver a public sector 
transformation project at scale and pace’ (Erens et al 2015b). This limits the transferability 
of lessons for `pioneer’ sites elsewhere. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is difficult to examine how the TAPIC framework contributes to better health outcomes in 
the case of IC in England since 2010. First, there is a weak evidence base, particularly 
relating to improved outcomes. Most studies focus on formative evaluation and on process 
elements, arguing that it is too early to detect any outcome improvements within 
summative evaluation.  Second, the elements of TAPIC tend not to appear to any great 
degree within the evidence base. However, this is arguably a failure of the evidence base, 
and does not necessarily negate the usefulness of TAPIC. 
However, it does appear that all five of the TAPIC domains (transparency, accountability, 
participation, integrity and capability) are lacking to some degree for many of the IC 
initiatives in some places, and so the optimistic view of introducing integration above is 
probably unlikely to lead to significant increases in desired outcomes. This may be a case of 
history repeating itself with the great expectations of IC initiatives often not met (Wistow et 
al 2015) yet again. However, as some of these initiatives are based on pilots (or Pioneers or 
Vanguards) there may be a positive ‘twist’ in the tale of two initiatives which may lead to 
lessons being learned in a future implementation to the wider health and social care system. 
On the other hand, wider policy capacity may not match that in the selected sites. 
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We observe an imbalance between them in terms of evidence and implementation. Whilst 
TAPIC potentially offers a collective assessment of IC, there is doubt as to whether each 
element is necessary and sufficient to describe and explain IC. There is some doubt too 
whether each carries equal weight. Historically, issues of accountability have tended to 
dominate English policy debates, usually towards central government rather than 
downwards to users and the public.  Yet a synergy between them is possible whereby, for 
example, transparency can support accountability, or participation can enhance integrity (or 
vice versa). We have noted the partial evidence base means gaps in knowledge about the 
process and outcomes of IC policies. Longitudinal studies would ameliorate this but the use 
of pilot programmes (Ettelt et al, 2015), rapid organisational change (Pollitt, 2009) and the 
legacy of previous efforts at IC militate against the learning from and transferability to the 
wider system. 
 
Both TAPIC (as a framework) and IC (as a case-study) offer insights into wider debates about 
the changing relationship between the state, its institutions, actors, users, and citizens. If 
the expectations of IC are to be met, then TAPIC framework may well have a value in 
understanding and explaining progress in that previously illusory goal. 
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